"The Post-American World: And the Rise of the Rest." by Fareed Zarkaria
Review by Patricia Mohr

 

In his 2008 book on the evolving dynamics of a globalized world, Fareed Zarkaria paints a striking yet optimistic portrait of a new world order. The book is striking because it predicts an inevitable transformation:  Rising economic powers like India, China, Russia, the European Union, Brazil and Mexico will assert greater power and gain greater influence on the world stage. It is optimistic because it depicts this change as a natural progression that creates challenge but not conflict.

Zarkaria asserts that the new world order does not inherently threaten American leadership. It does, however, mean Americans will have less power relative to other countries. And it will force the United States to adopt a new approach to world politics.

The United States can maintain a leadership role in the new world order. But it will have to forgo the benefits of being the sole dominant power. “The United States occupies the top spot in the emerging system, but it is also the country that is most challenged by the new order,” Zarkaria writes. He suggests that the United States is challenged by the changing geopolitics because it is the country that benefits the most by the current system and, therefore, has the most to lose.

Under the old system, the United States played a central role in nearly every significant economic and political decision. In the early 1990s, former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker described the modern structure as a hub-and-spoke system, where every country would go through the United States to pursue its goals. Today, countries and international actors are increasingly interacting around, rather than through, the central hub of the United States.

“In a post-American world, there may be no center to integrate into,” Zarkaria writes. This means that U.S. values will no longer determine the rules of the game or define the conditions by which international transactions take place. Whereas in the past, new participants joined the Western system by conforming to the existing order, the new system incorporates new players along with their values and methods. In effect, rising powers will redefine the system.

Bruce Nussbaum summed up the consequence of this change nicely in his May 2, 2008 review of The Post-American World for Business Week:

            “When the US was the overwhelming power, everyone else had to learn American culture. The big change in the 21st century is now the US has to learn everyone else's culture. It needs to share power, build coalitions, create legitimacy, in order to lead and prosper.”

It is noteworthy that Zarkaria’s analysis of the modern world makes a key distinction between “Americanization” or “Westernization” and “standardization.” He says that as developing countries modernize, they adopt methods that appeal to the mass culture. “Modernity becomes a melting pot” as it integrates different geographies, histories, interests, business patterns and capabilities into its fold.

This is a significant departure from other writers who portray modernization as a Western process. By viewing the phenomenon through Zarkaria’s lens, it becomes easier to see that even though Western powers have mastered the modernization process, they don’t control its destiny. As more participants take part in the global economy, the global order becomes more complex and multicultural. English will continue to be the dominant language used in modern business transactions. But the new norm integrates local customs and languages into its fabric.

From Reluctant Hegemony to Arrogant Empire

The great paradox in U.S. history is that although Americans have consistently resisted the notion of empire, the country is increasingly adopting an imperial foreign policy approach.

Zarkaria illustrates how this change in attitude happened and what the consequences have been. He takes the reader back to the Soviet Union collapse in 1991 and reminds us that President George H.W. Bush embraced a foreign policy of multilateralism even though the country acquired the status as the sole remaining superpower. The former president took a cautious approach, which consolidated the gains of the Soviet Union collapse without “triumphantly claiming victory.”

During the 1990s, the balance of power shifted into the United States’ hands, whether or not U.S. leaders sought it. As Zarkaria says, the “pull of unipolarity” strengthened during President Clinton’s term in office, especially when Europe’s attempts at resolving the Balkan conflicts foundered. The September 11, 2001 terror attacks against America changed U.S. foreign policymaking and, as a consequence, the way the world views Washington. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq marked the shift to a U.S.-centric imperial approach and the start of a “new global empire,” Zarkaria writes. Arrogance replaced caution.

The world once viewed America with awe. Now the world fears American power. Zarkaria points to a poll that cited a majority of Europeans naming the United States as the greatest threat to world peace. The problem, according to Zarkaria, is not only one of U.S. aggression. It is also that U.S. foreign policy is narrowly focused on a national agenda that ignores the larger global environment. “To foreigners, American officials seem clueless about the world they are supposed to be running,” Zarkaria writes.

Compromise and Cooperation

Zarkaria’s challenge to policymakers is this:  Change course or court danger. Drawing upon lessons from history, Zarkaria says U.S. leaders should choose the Otto von Bismarck model over the British model. That is, the United States should engage rising powers like Russia and China, rather than set them apart.

It is worth noting that this choice is not just an academic exercise. We have seen the question being debating in the presidential election, particularly in regards to the question of Russia’s reemerging role in geopolitics. Sen. McCain supports a policy of divide. He would organize like-minded allies into a League of Democracies, which could impose sanctions on rogue states without having to gain approval from Russia and China. Sen. Obama appears to support the Bismarck model of engagement though his policy on NATO expansion into Ukraine and the Caucuses suggests otherwise.

Zarkaria asserts that the new world order demands leadership that foments compromise and cooperation on multiple levels. He says that to maintain a leadership position, Washington will have to share its decision-making authority with other world capitals, multilateral institutions and nongovernmental organizations—an argument that is not likely to go over well with neoconservatives.

Zarkaria argues that U.S. leadership was at its best when it created institutions for multinational negotiation and monetary management, which has fostered global economic growth and benefitted the world at large. His point is clear when he adds that U.S. leaders chose a cooperative approach “not out of fear and vulnerability but out of confidence and strength.” They followed a path of “enlightened self-interest that took account of the interests of others” and showed the world U.S. power should not be feared. The post-World War I League of Nations laid the groundwork for the post-World War II United Nations, which U.S. power has since undermined and delegitimized.

I agree with Zarkaria that it is no longer a question as to whether to United States should adopt a cooperative approach, it is becoming an imperative. Though the Economist chided Zarkaria for citing too many American-based sources, the magazine agreed that America must “choose its priorities, work closely with allies and agree on international rules of interaction.”

Optimistic or Not?

Overall Zarkaria is optimistic that a multipolar international system will benefit the world at large. Impoverished populations in developing countries will gain from economic growth even as American firms and investors profit from emerging economies. His optimism, however, is negated by his prediction that U.S. policymakers will not make the right policy choices. He says rather than recognize the true challenges of the emerging world order, U.S. leaders are preoccupied by “paranoia and panic.”

Though Zarkaria spends a great deal of effort trying to debunk alarmist points of view, it is not clear that he succeeded. Politicians and media outlets still paint the view of an America threatened by foreign competition and Islamic fundamentalism. The risk is that leaders will choose protectionism and isolationism over open and outward-looking approach, which has fostered U.S. innovation and strength in the past.

As the Jerusalem Post noted in its May 25 review of the book, Zarkaria didn’t seem confident that U.S. leaders would choose the right path:

    “In the 21st century, Zarkaria proclaims, prosperity is even more pervasive than peace. Thanks to the free flow of capital, technological innovations, the revolution in communications and the spread of independent banks, countries all over the world are booming…. [Yet] He leaves us wondering whether the American economy and American society, like India's, will ‘adjust, adapt and persevere’ anyway.” 

It is interesting that since Zarkaria released his book last spring, he has changed his pessimistic view about U.S. politics. In his October 20 Newsweek column, Zarkaria suggests that the recent economic crisis is “wake-up call from hell” that will force policymakers to change their ways.

Change is indeed inevitable. As I write these concluding remarks, world leaders drafting plans to overhaul the rules and institutions that manage the international economic system. Zarkaria’s new world order seems close at hand.